Penelhum’s arguments on Hume’s concept of personal identity in terms of“linguistic mistake”: A Defense
Keywords:
David Hume, Terence Penelhum, Personal Identity, Numerical and Qualitative Identity, Conventional Regulations, Linguistic ConsistencyAbstract
In this paper, I have pointed out how Penelhum overruled Hume’s interpretation of identity theory in his famous work “Hume on Personal Identity”. This paper has argued that the extent to which Hume’s theory of identity is tenable in this respect and has tried to make clear that Penelhum’s interpretation of Hume’s theory is in no way tenable. Penelhum thinks that Hume misinterpreted the linguistic convention in describing identity theories, that he did not use the words “numerically one” and“variable” correctly, to clarify the “identity” term in his work “A Treatise of Human Nature”. Because, according to Penelhum, Hume tried to explain the identity of animals and plants based only on general views, where he did not use examples such as sentences or musical themes to explain the identity properly. However, the main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Hume’s account of personal identity is a logically plausible account.
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