Quine on Observation Sentence: A Philosophical Reflection

• Dr. Hasen Ali Ahmed

  Indira Gandhi College, Boitamari

  Author

  https://orcid.org/0009-0005-0832-571X

Being a naturalized epistemologist and radical conceptual relativist, Quine invokes the observation sentence instead of sentences to establish a direct relation between input and output. The main contention of this paper is to explore the philosophical insights of Quine’s observation sentence as the foundation of his naturalized epistemology.  Quine’s concept carries both positive and negative implications. Positively, it sets the paradigm for his philosophical journey and introduces a dynamic interpretation of pragmatic philosophy that would set the tone for future philosophy. Negatively, it faces serious criticism from contemporaries such as Chomsky, Davidson and others. The strategy of this paper is to offer a simplistic account of Quine’s observation sentence with philosophical reflection. Quine argues it differs radically from sentences in general in complexity and number, being tied to straightforward, specifiable dispositions to assent. Moreover, observation sentences are limited. The number of sentences that any given speaker acquires as observation sentences by direct conditioning to stimulation is quite small. This kind of learning proceeds sentence-by-sentence, while sentences in general cannot be learned one-by-one. Thus, Quine develops a behaviourist account of language acquisition through external behaviour, on the basis of which he denies any philosophical dogmas and, instead of traditional epistemology, invokes a naturalized epistemology backed up by natural science and common sense.

1. Dr. Hasen Ali Ahmed, Indira Gandhi College, Boitamari

   Assistant Professor

   Department: Philosophy

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