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Is Use Enough? The Problem of Normativity in Wittgenstein's Theory of Meaning

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Abstract

In his later work, particularly in the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein emphasizes that grasping meaning demands accepting the varied frameworks and practices within which language functions. This method highlights the everyday use of language over theoretical definitions, underlining the consequence of social interactions and experiences in constructing meaning. Here, it will be made to explain a full study of the normativity issues associated with Ludwig Wittgenstein's use theory of meaning, as seen in Philosophical Investigations (1953). Wittgenstein's denial of the referential theory of meaning augments investigations into the capability of public practices in speaking linguistic truth and engages with continuing anxieties in the philosophy of language. The paper: (1) reconstructs Wittgenstein's criticisms of ostensive definition and private language; (2) investigates Saul Kripke's (1982) skeptical challenge on rule-following; (3) evaluates John McDowell's (1984) "second nature" response and Baker & Hacker's (1985) conventionalist interpretation; and (4) argues that Wittgenstein's emphasis on training (§§143–155) and custom (§198) provides a non-reductive explanation of normativity. Building on the recent works of Meredith Williams (1999) and Charles Travis (2008), the paper claims that by understanding normativity as resulting from socially embodied know-how rather than from clear laws, Wittgenstein's model avoids circularity.

Keywords: Wittgenstein, meaning as use, normativity, rule-following, language game

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1. Introduction

1. The Problem of Meaning in Philosophical Inquiry

The topic of what constitutes meaning has been a fundamental interest of philosophy since antiquity. Traditional theories—ranging from Plato's Cratylus to Frege's sense-reference distinction—have sought to anchor meaning in abstract concepts, mental representations, or objective referents. However, these models struggle to explain how language acts dynamically in everyday contexts, as words modify meaning dependent on use, purpose, and social practice.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's later work, particularly Philosophical Investigations (1953), altered this debate by claiming that meaning is not a thing but an activity—grounded in the practical, public, and rule-governed uses of language. His famous dictum, "For a large class of cases, the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (PI §43), destroyed centuries of essentialist and mentalist beliefs. Yet this pragmatic viewpoint presents a key question: If meaning is determined by usage, what ensures its normative dimension—the boundary between correct and erroneous application?

1.1 Wittgenstein's Paradigm Shift

In the course of his career, Wittgenstein made a transition from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations, which might be interpreted as a significant advance in the concept of philosophy. In later years, Wittgenstein criticized this concept, stating that it was an illusion of "crystalline purity" (§107). He argued that meaning is fundamentally heterogeneous and depends on the context in which it is observed. This was in contrast to the earlier Wittgenstein, who attempted to limit language through logical atomism (§3.203). The paradigm shift that Wittgenstein brought about is fraught with great significance. By asserting that comprehension goes beyond the simple explanation of logical structures and includes the act of interacting with the language activities that constitute genuine illustrations of reality, it challenges the conventional epistemic

evaluation approaches that have been used in the past. This has impacted later theorists like J.L. Austin and Donald Davidson conducted further analysis of these concepts in the realms of pragmatics and speech act theory.

This transition has ramifications beyond philosophy, permeating cognitive science, where scholars examine the impact of language on cognitive processes and interpersonal dynamics. The importance of meanings depends on circumstances has produced new visions into communication models and linguistic relativity.

To summarize, Wittgenstein's progression from a rigorous logical framework in Tractatus to a livelier outset of meaning in Philosophical Investigations shows an essential pattern alteration in philosophy. It prompts us to reexamine our interface with language and our understanding of knowledge across diverse frameworks.

1.2 The Normativity Gap in Use-Theory

Although it eliminates issues associated with mentalism (for example, Locke's "ideas"), it would appear that the use theory does not have any criteria for correct application. This is despite the fact that it avoids these problems. This is articulated in a dramatic fashion by Kripke (1982), who presents the question, "What prevents a community from calling '68+57' identical to '5" (p. 16)?

A "normativity gap" is the absence of normative rules that specify how terms should be applied within a culture. This is what is meant by the term "normativity gap." In the work that he has produced, Saul Kripke has offered a thought experiment that involves mathematics. This experiment draws attention to the issue at hand. What would prevent a community from declaring that "68 + 57" equals "5"? That is the question that has to be answered. The absence of set norms that control mathematical processes is demonstrated by this scenario, which shows the possibilities of misuse or misinterpretation.

In the event that communities are free to define terms solely on the basis of usage, without respect to any external norms, there is the possibility that meanings will become arbitrary. As an illustration of this, consider the scenario in which one group took the choice to redefine fundamental arithmetic operations in a manner that was in

direct opposition to the standards that had been set. Because of this, there would be challenges in terms of communication and comprehension between the various classes of people.

In addition to language and mathematical challenges, the following are also included: A consequence of the normativity gap is that it creates difficulties not just for the discourse of language but also for the discourse of mathematics. It is possible for mathematical claims to lose their coherence and dependability if they are not founded on common norms and standards, which are fundamental to the discipline of mathematics.

Criteria that are objective in comparison to social practices: Use theory has trouble articulating objective standards that go beyond the interpretations of people or groups, despite the fact that it places a significant focus on social behaviors as the foundation for meaning. One of the most important aspects of the normativity gap is the conflict that emerges between individuals' subjective usage and the validity of objective usage.

Wider philosophical debates concerning the opposition between realism and anti-realism in the fields of mathematics and language. The repercussions, which extend into the area of philosophy, have an impact on the field of philosophy. Assuming that meanings are entirely dependent on social activities and that there are no normative restrictions placed on such practices, it presents a challenge to the traditional views that have been held about truth and objectivity.

In an effort to bridge the gap between social practices and normative standards, a number of philosophers have suggested frameworks that incorporate the two types of standards. These could be regarded as possible solutions to the problem/issue. In accordance with these frameworks, meanings may change as a consequence of their utilization; yet, in order for meanings to be consistent and coherent across a number of contexts, they must also conform to a set of requirements.

Kripke's thought experiment on arithmetic operations is a clear demonstration of how use theory reveals fundamental concerns about normative norms for application. The experiment was conducted on arithmetic operations. Utilization theory, in conclusion, provides essential insights into the process by which meaning is formed through the interaction of individuals with one another. The normativity gap should be closed by

philosophers who are interested in understanding the relationship between language, mathematics, and human cognition. These philosophers should continue to make efforts to improve the situation.

2. Wittgenstein's Use Theory of Meaning

2.1 The Augustinian Picture and Its Limits

An examination of St. Augustine's Confessions serves as the starting point for Ludwig Wittgenstein's critique of language, which is particularly found in his work Philosophical Investigations. In this seminal work, Augustine makes the argument that the primary function of words is to give names to material things. This viewpoint, despite the fact that it seems intuitive, is called into question by Wittgenstein through a number of thought exercises that demonstrate the limitations of referential theories of meaning.

It is indexical.

The phenomenon of indexicality, in which the meaning of particular terms changes depending on the context in which they are used, is one of the most important concerns that Wittgenstein tackles. The term "this" might, for example, be used to refer to a variety of distinct things depending on the speaker's position and the intention they are attempting to convey at any given moment. An essential fault in the Augustinian vision is brought to light by this variability: the Augustinian picture presumes that there is a fixed relationship between words and the things that they refer to. In actuality, language is fluid and depends on the surrounding environment. In his essay titled "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," the philosopher John Perry makes the observation that indexical pose a challenge to the notion that fixed references are capable of capturing any and all aspects of meaning.

There is a differentiation of functions.

It is through the utilization of examples of functional variation in language that Wittgenstein offers additional demonstrations of his criticism. He demonstrates how a single utterance can serve multiple meanings depending on the circumstances by using the exclamation "Fire!" He is demonstrating how a single utterance can serve multiple functions, such as conveying a warning or offering a command. The notion that words are simply used to name things is a complicated one because of the many different

functions that they provide. Instead, words serve a variety of functions within a wide range of contexts and interact with people in a variety of ways. Michael Travis, a philosopher, provides further elaboration on this subject in his essay titled "The Uses of 'This,'" in which he emphasizes that in order to appreciate language, one must accept the different applications of language rather than strictly adhering to naming rules. Travis's work is regarded as an excellent example of this.

The analogy of the toolbox

A classic comparison between words and tools in a toolbox is made by Wittgenstein in section 11 of his book Philosophical Investigations. He says, "Think of the tools in a toolbox: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw... among other tools." Although the roles of these items are quite varied, the functions of words are just as varied. This parallel illustrates his argument against the Augustinian approach by saying that just as tools have different applications depending on the activities that are being performed, so too do words function within a wide variety of language practices. It is abundantly evident that language cannot be reduced to the straightforward act of naming particular things. This is due to the fact that each word can be employed for a multitude of functions, including descriptive, imperative, interrogative, and other functions.

After taking into consideration Wittgenstein's inquiry into language, it becomes clear that the Augustinian worldview has a number of significant holes in it. By calling attention to phenomena such as indexicality and functional variety, he calls into question the conventional referential theories that have been utilized in the past. He also pushes for an understanding of language that is founded on its practical application within certain contexts or environments. The efficacy of his toolbox analogy comes in the fact that it serves as a forceful reminder that meaning is not formed from set definitions but rather from the myriad ways in which we engage with language in our day-to-day lives. This is the reason why his analogy is so useful.

2.2 A Taxonomy of Language Games

As a means of explaining the many functions that language performs, Ludwig Wittgenstein proposes the concept of language games in his later works, particularly in Philosophical Investigations. This is done in order to illustrate the functions that

language serves. There are at least six distinct categories that illustrate the ways in which words are utilized in a variety of settings, and he identifies a large number of different forms of language games.

It is necessary to have: These are commands or requests, such as "Slab!" which, due to the fact that it is a command, instructs someone to carry out a particular action. Rather than being a statement about the reality of the situation, imperatives draw attention to the performative aspect of language, which is when the utterance itself is a call to action rather than a statement about the circumstance itself.

Statements such as "It is raining" are instances of reports, which are statements in which the speaker provides information on situations that occur in the world. Statements like these are examples of reports. Reports are written with the intention of conveying descriptive information and are written with the objective of expressing factual information.

There are many different phrases, some of which involve emotive exclamations such as "Ouch!" Examples of expressions that describe feelings or reactions rather than describing things or events include the expressions that are presented here. These assertions typically emerge of their own volition and are manifestations of immediate human experiences. They are regularly made by different people.

Additionally, language has the capacity to explain rules, such as the statement "Kings move diagonally," which provides advice on how to efficiently play a game such as chess on a diagonal. The normative affirmations that teach action are given a lot of weight in this form of language game, which is played within the context of specific situations.

Lines like "Once upon a time" are examples of fictional discourse. When it comes to fictional discourse, tales that begin with lines like these are examples of fictional speech. In order to engage in imaginative storytelling, the objective of these narratives is not to provide factual information but rather to engage in those activities.

Jokes, which rely on shared cultural knowledge and linguistic playfulness to generate laughter, are a means by which humor and wit can be embodied. For more information, read Stern (2004), page 94; also refer to PI §23. Jokes are a great illustration of how context and social conventions can significantly impact the meaning of something.

Individual Differences in Relationships Within Families and Anti-Essentialism When Wittgenstein draws a comparison between language games and family resemblances, he ultimately develops the concept of family resemblances (Principia Philosophica §66). It is his argument that meanings do not possess requirements that are prerequisites that are necessary and sufficient; rather, they share overlapping features that are comparable to threads that are intertwined in a rope (Pacific Islander §67). According to this point of view, the sense-reference model that Gottlob Frege proposed in 1892 is called into question. According to this concept, every expression has a preset meaning that is derived from its reference and sense. This paradigm claims that everything has a meaning.

According to Wittgenstein's anti-essentialism, rather than searching for definitive criteria for meaning, we should embrace the fluidity and interconnection of individuals who engage in language activities. This is the proposal brought up by Wittgenstein. Instead of adhering to tight definitions, the worth of words increases when they are utilized in a range of contexts at the same time.

The Argument in Favor of the Use of Confidential Language It is widely acknowledged that the argument that Wittgenstein presented against private language, which can be found in Philosophical Investigations (PI §§243–315), is often regarded as one of the most significant contributions that he made. Before he may be rejected, he must first make three significant allegations, which are as follows:

The business is not a private enterprise: The statement made by Wittgenstein is that a sensory label, such as "S," cannot be defined only through mental reference (§258). The incapacity to exhibit experiences in public weakens the concept of private meanings that are independent from the comprehension of the society.

The absence of any criteria for correctness as follows: If one were to define sensations in a private fashion, then any assertion made about them would be devoid of an objective norm, which would effectively equate to the declaration that "Whatever seems right is right" (p. 258). He maintains that this would be the case if one were to define sensations in a private manner. In private words, there is a lack of clarity around what constitutes correctness because there are no guidelines to guide the process.

For the Benefit of the General Public: It is necessary for members of a community to effectively coordinate their corrective actions in order to achieve meaning (§202). Wittgenstein argues that language is fundamentally dependent on public interactions; hence, private languages that are devoid of the validation of the community are unable to maintain meaningful communication. Wittgenstein's argument can be found in the following sentence.

In the realm of academic discourse, there has been a substantial amount of discussion over the implications of Wittgenstein's private language argument. According to Saul Kripke (1982), this rejection is interpreted as leading to doubt about rules themselves (page 62). He suggests that this raises questions about our ability to obey rules consistently when they lack public foundation.

This is refuted by John McDowell (1984), who argues that the discoveries made by Wittgenstein lend credence to the idea that normativity is founded on social principles (p. 342). When it comes to the manner in which our perception of meaning and truth is influenced by common practices, McDowell lays a strong emphasis on the subject.

By utilizing concepts such as family resemblance and public validation, Wittgenstein's investigation into language games not only sheds light on the complexity and diversity that are present in linguistic activities, but it also poses a challenge to conventional notions of meaning. In conclusion, Wittgenstein's investigation into language games sheds light on the complexity and diversity that are present in linguistic activities.

3. The Normativity Problem

3.1 Introduction to the Normativity Challenge

Although Wittgenstein's use theory of meaning was successful in demolishing referential and mentalist theories of language, it is confronted with a basic philosophical problem: how can mere usage provide normative norms for correct versus incorrect language application?According to Boghossian (1989), on page 513, the term "normativity" refers to the "ought" that governs language, which is the reason why we should use certain words in specific ways rather than others.

This section examines:

1. A skeptical paradox proposed by Kripke (1982), which contends that previous use does not adequately predict future meaning.
2. The limitations of communal practice replies (for example, Baker and Hacker, 1985) are discussed.
3. Inferentialism, proposed by Brandom and McDowell's "second nature," are two examples of alternative answers.

3.2 **Kripke's Skeptical Paradox**

3.2.1 The "+" vs. "quus" Example

- An example of a thought experiment is provided by Kripke (1982) to construct his challenge. Let us say that someone has always used the symbol "+" to signify addition.
- In the past, a skeptic contends that the symbol "+" could have been interpreted as "quus," where the equation is: *x quus y = x + y if x, y is less than 57, else = 5* (Kripke, 1982, page 9).
- The "finitude problem" refers to the fact that there is no finite set of past applications that may completely correct future applications.
- No fact about the speaker's mind or behavior in the past can be used to assess whether or not anything is correct.

3.2.2 Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Paradox (PI §201)

- A forerunner to Kripke's dilemma is brought up by Wittgenstein himself, who states, "This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule" (PI §201).
- Important Concerns:
- Insufficiently determined: There are an endless number of possible interpretations for rules such as "add 2" (for example, "add 2 until 1000, then 4").
- Private Rules: If meaning were internal, there would be no criterion to differentiate between "following" and "seeming to follow" (Private Rules §258).

3.2.3 Kripke's Three Problems

Kripke generalizes the paradox into three challenges:

1. The Finitude Problem: Existing applications cannot be fixed by using them in the past.
2. The problem with dispositions is that even a speaker's dispositions, such as their tendency to calculate, cannot be used to assess correctness because dispositions might be flawed.
3. The problem with dispositions is that even a speaker's dispositions, such as their tendency to calculate, cannot be used to assess correctness because dispositions might be flawed.

3.3 Communal Practice Responses

3.3.1 Wittgenstein's Appeal to "Customs" (PI §198)

- "To obey a rule is a practice [...] To think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule" ("To obey a rule is not to obey a rule") is a statement made by Wittgenstein, who suggests that normativity originates from communal practices.
- The Suggested Resolution:
- Shared methods of application are what decide whether or not anything is correct (Baker & Hacker, 1985, page 147).
- An illustration of how a youngster learns the word "red" is when they are chastised when they label a green thing "red."

3.3.2 Critiques of Communal Practice

- Circularity (Boghossian, 1989): If the accuracy of something is dependent on the agreement of the community, then how can we distinguish the appropriate community?
- The statement "68 + 57 = 5" could be considered correct by a subgroup of deviants.
- Relativism (Williams, 1999): Is it possible that the phrase "Jews are subhuman" might be linguistically valid by using Nazi German?

- In Wright's 1980 book, "Regress," the author asks, "How does the community itself correctly follow rules?"

3.4 Alternative Solutions to Normativity

3.4.1 McDowell's "Second Nature" (1984)

- According to McDowell, normativity is instilled through the process of bildung, which is cultural training. Children absorb norms in an implicit manner, similar to how they learn a craft.
- Receptivity to the reasons provided: Perceptual knowledge of "how to go on" is the source of correct use, according to McDowell (1984), that is on page 350.
- For instance, a musician is able to "follow" a melody without being specifically instructed to do so.

3.4.2 Brandom's Inferentialism (1994)

- The normativity of social scorekeeping is based on Brandom's argument:
- Meaning is created through the exchange of obligations and entitlements in conversation.
- As an illustration, acknowledging that "This is red" is equivalent to denying that "This is green."

3.4.3 Empirical Support: Child Language Acquisition

- Tomasello (2003) found that toddlers learn norms through the process of receiving corrective feedback, such as when their parents reject the term "dog" in favor of "cat."
- An example of pattern recognition would be statistical learning of word boundaries, as described by Saffran et al. in 1996.

3.5 Synthesis: Is Use Enough?

Normativity is suggested to be the following by Wittgenstein's use theory, which is complemented by McDowell and Brandom:

1. Embodied in society: not through explicit rules but by actions that have been trained.
2. Dynamic: Changeable by the introduction of new linguistic games (for example, digital communication).
3. The ability to not be reduced to behavioral dispositions or mental states is referred to as non-reductive.

- Challenges that still need to be addressed include cross-cultural variation: do all cultures ground normativity in the same way? On the subject of Pirahã number words, please refer to Everett's work from 2005.
- Restrictions imposed by AI: Without embodied sociality, is it possible for machines to ever understand normative use?

4. Resolving Normativity: Defending Wittgenstein's Use Theory

4.1 Introduction: The Normativity Dilemma Revisited

The use theory of meaning proposed by Wittgenstein is confronted with an ongoing obstacle: if meaning is founded on practice, then how can practices themselves produce normative standards (also known as correctness conditions)?An analysis of three primary approaches to resolving this conundrum is presented in this section:

1. The concept of norms as culturally embedded know-how is discussed in McDowell's "Second Nature" (1984).
2. The conventionalist theory proposed by Baker and Hacker in 1985 describes rules as socially learnt techniques.
3. Meaning is defined as commitment in communication, according to Brandom's inferentialism (1994).

In this paper, we demonstrate that the framework of Wittgenstein, when combined with these techniques, offers a non-reductive yet coherent account of normativity.

4.2 McDowell's "Second Nature": Norms as Embodied Know-How

4.2.1 The Concept of Bildung

In his argument that normativity is implanted through cultural training (Bildung), McDowell (1984) draws on Gadamer's hermeneutics to argue that correct use is more of a matter of perceptual awareness than it is of explicit rules:

"We are initiated into conceptual capacities by having our eyes opened to reasons […] as part of our second nature" (McDowell, 1994, page 84).

- Important Mechanisms:
- Implicit learning occurs when children learn norms through training that is similar to that of an apprentice (for example, changing the word "sheeps" to "sheep").
- Responding to Reasons: Competent speakers "see" what constitutes proper use (for example, recognizing sarcasm in the context of the sentence).

4.2.2 Empirical Support: Neural Plasticity and Norms

- According to research conducted in the field of neuroscience, mirror neurons are activated not only when conducting rule-governed behaviors but also when viewing them (for example, gestural language; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008).
- It is procedural memory that is responsible for tacit norm-following, such as the internalization of grammar (Ullman, 2004).
- An example of this would be a chess player who, even without recalling the FIDE rules, has an innate understanding that unlawful moves break the "form of life" of the game.

4.2.3 Limitations of McDowell's Account

- In the context of opaque transmission, how does Bildung differentiate between actual understanding and mimicry?
- Culture bias is a presumption of universal "reasonableness," however norms might vary from culture to culture (for example, rule-of-law civilizations against honor cultures).

4.3 Baker & Hacker's Conventionalism: Rules as Techniques

4.3.1 The Mastery Model of Rule-Following

- According to Baker and Hacker (1985), rules are public methods that are mastered in the same way as crafts are mastered (for example, carpentry or dance): "To follow a rule is to be trained into a practice where 'correctness' is shown, not stated" (Baker & Hacker, 1985, page 171).
- Principal Characteristics:
- The process of learning involves a series of different steps, including trial and error, as well as correction (PI §208: "This is how to play").
- Decisions that are in agreement: Reactions that are shared, such as laughter at inappropriate use, help to maintain norms (PI §242).

4.3.2 Case Study: Color Term Acquisition

- Children learn color boundaries through the use of corrective reinforcement (for example, "No, that is blue, not green"; Winawer et al., 2007). This is supported by research that was conducted across multiple cultures.
- According to Roberson et al. (2000), the Himba tribe maintains intragroup normativity despite the fact that they have a different way of classifying colors.

4.3.3 Challenges to Conventionalism

- Problem of Regression: How did the earliest people who followed rules learn when there were no precedents?
- Who has the authority to intervene and correct whom? See Brandom's article on "scorekeeping" for more information.

4.4 Brandom's Inferentialism: Norms as Social Commitments

4.4.1 The Game of Giving and Asking for Reasons

- The normativity of discursive activities is based on Brandom's (1994) principles:
- Recommendations: The assertion that "This is red" is equivalent to the denial of "This is blue."
- In the process of scorekeeping, communities monitor the rights of speakers to claims.
- In a court trial, for instance, the concept of "reasonable doubt" is not established by private rules but rather via dialogue.

4.4.2 Strengths Over Individualist Accounts

- Private language should be avoided because norms are intersubjective (see to PI §202).
- The term "tweet" serves as an example of a new use that emerges as a result of community support.

4.4.3 Limitations

- Excessive intellectualization is characterized by the assumption of high inferential capacities, in contrast to Wittgenstein's emphasis on rudimentary language games.
- The practice of scorekeeping may be a reflection of hegemony (for example, academic jargon's tendency to marginalize dialects).

4.5 Synthesis: A Wittgensteinian Resolution

4.5.1 Normativity as Embedded Practice

- The most important discoveries of Wittgenstein, which were expanded upon by McDowell and Brandom, show that normativity originates from:
- Drilling is a training method that instills baseline responsiveness (PI §5).
- PI §198: Customs: Regularities become normative through the process of habit.
- Attitudes that are reactive (PI §208): Praise and criticism are what maintain standards.

- As an illustration, a violinist may acquire vibrato through mimicry, correction, and eventually "feel," which is analogous to the process of acquiring linguistic norms.

4.5.2 Addressing Kripke's Challenge

- As an argument against skepticism, the failure of deviance (for example, "quus") might be attributed to the fact that it disregards the holistic nature of practices (one cannot stray systematically without losing it).
- The argument against circularity is that communities are not homogeneous; subgroups, such as scientists, specialize standards without falling into relativism.

4.5.3 Unresolved Issues

- Regarding animal cognition, is it possible for non-human animals, such as primates, to take part in normative practices?
- How do emoji or texts generated by artificial intelligence affect the concept of "correct" use?

5. Conclusion: Wittgenstein's Use Theory and the Grounding of Normativity

By moving the focus from abstract reference to concrete application, Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy brought about a revolution in the study of language. It was his realization that "the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (Philosophical Investigations §43) that destroyed centuries of essentialist and mentalist assumptions in the field of semantics. By contrast, the use-based theory proposed by Wittgenstein is confronted with a significant obstacle, as this research has demonstrated:Is it possible for linguistic practices to be the sole causes of normativity, which refers to the difference between appropriate and inappropriate use?

Key Findings

1. Wittgenstein's rejection of the Augustinian picture (paragraph 1) and ostensive definition (paragraphs 28–38) successfully demonstrated that meaning is not set by private mental activities or external referents, but rather develops from involvement in

2. language games. This was demonstrated by Wittgenstein's rejection of the Augustinian vision.
3. Kripke's (1982) skeptical paradox brought to light a potential gap in Wittgenstein's account: if meaning is decided by use, what prevents arbitrary or deviant interpretations (for example, "plus" meaning "quus")? This is the Normativity Problem.
    - For the purpose of defending normativity, McDowell's "Second Nature" (1984) contended that normativity is established through cultural training (Bildung), which makes correct use a question of embodied know-how rather than explicit norms.
    - Conventionalism, which was written by Baker and Hacker in 1985, highlighted that rule-following is a discipline that can be mastered, similar to a craft, and that it is maintained by corrective procedures within a society.
4. A Wittgensteinian answer to the problem: At the same time, normativity is neither Platonic (which is based on abstract laws) nor just conventional (which can be reduced to the use of the majority). In its place, it originates from:
    - PI §5: Children learn by repetition and correction. Training and drill are related to this concept.
    - Some examples of shared reactive attitudes include rejection of misuse, as outlined in PI §208.
    - PI §23, which is the base of agreement in judgments, is referred to as Forms of Life.

- Observations and Implications for Current Discussions
- The structure that Wittgenstein developed is still important for:
- In the field of philosophy of language, formal semantics, such as Chomskyan syntax, is challenged by placing an emphasis on circumstances and pragmatics.
- Within the field of cognitive science, embodied and enactive theories of meaning are supported (for example, Varela et al., 1991).
- A number of problems in huge language models, such as ChatGPT, which do not have the embodied, social grounding of human meaning, are brought to light by artificial intelligence and machine learning (Bender & Koller, 2020).

Limitations and Future Directions

1. Does normativity function in a similar manner across all linguistic communities? This is referred to as cross-cultural validity. (Take Everett's research of Pirahã from 2005 as an example.)
2. Is it possible for Wittgenstein's concept to be applied to animal signaling systems, such as ape gestures, in the context of non-human communication?
3. Games of Digital Language: How do online communities (such as Twitter slang and the use of emoji) affect the normative behaviors that people engage in?

The Closing Synthesis

It is possible to obtain a robust account of normativity that avoids both skepticism and Platonism by utilizing Wittgenstein's use theory in conjunction with McDowell's emphasis on training and Baker and Hacker's conventionalism. It is not because it reflects reality or adheres to mental norms that meaning is considered normative; rather, it is because it is ingrained in practices that are shared and maintained by society. That language is a living practice and that its norms are woven into the fabric of human life is reaffirmed by this conclusion, which demonstrates that Wittgenstein's relevance will continue to be relevant.

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