How to think about Process Types

Surajit Barua

doi:10.65842/nbpa.v2.i2.007

Authors

Surajit Barua Seth Anandram Jaipuria College Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.65842/nbpa.v2.i2.007

Keywords:

Process Reliabilism, Process Types, Generality Problem, Justification

Abstract

Process Reliabilism, originally formulated by Goldman as a theory of justification, faces the generality problem. Any particular belief is a process token/instantiation of a large number of broader or narrower process types, each having a distinct level of reliability. The problem is to select the unique, repeatable type. This is now considered a major problem for process reliabilism. In this paper, I examine the structure of processes in general, apply the understanding obtained from that fresh perspective on process types to analyse the Generality problem and conclude that, when properly interpreted, William Alston's solution proposed in 1995 is the right candidate for solving it.

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